Costs of Exchange Rate Volatility for Labour Markets - Empirical Evidence from the CEE Economies by Ansgar Belke & Ralph Setzer
The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter, 2003, pp. 267–292
Costs of Exchange Rate Volatility for 
Labour Markets: Empirical Evidence 
from the CEE Economies*
ANSGAR BELKE
University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart
RALPH SETZER
University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart
Abstract: According to the traditional ‘optimum currency area’ approach, little will be lost from a
very hard peg to a currency union if there is little reason for using the exchange rate in response
to economic shocks. This paper takes a different approach and highlights the fact that high
exchange rate volatility may as well signal high costs for labour markets. The impact of exchange
rate volatility on labour markets in the CEECs is analysed, finding that volatility vis-à-vis the
euro significantly increases unemployment. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility
could be considered as a substitute for the removal of employment protection legislation.
I INTRODUCTION
T
he transition process from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy in Central and Eastern Europe has been accompanied by a large
decline in employment. While relative improvements have been recorded in
some countries for the last two years, unemployment reduction has still been
modest in relation to expectations. At the beginning of the transition process
it was widely assumed that the sharp immediate increase in open
unemployment would be of a temporary nature only. Most analysts expected
that unemployment would soon stop rising and with economic recovery
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weights. We also profited very much from comments by Neil Foster.unemployment would level off at a relatively low level (Nesporova, 2002).
However, employment performance did not improve a great deal in most
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), though this was partly
due to unfavourable developments in world markets. Besides, longer-term
effects of structural change in the candidate economies have also played an
important role. The countries with the largest expected increases in
unemployment – Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania – were among those with the
highest levels. The situation in the individual countries is, of course, highly
differentiated, with Hungary and Estonia at the lower bound and Slovakia,
Poland and Bulgaria at the upper bound, with unemployment rates exceeding
15 per cent. Yet, in all candidate countries labour markets suffer from
structural rigidities that, in combination with continued restructuring, will
put a lower limit on reductions in the unemployment rates.
This paper investigates to what extent high exchange rate variability can
be made responsible for the negative developments in CEEC labour markets.
Previous studies have shown that intra-European exchange rate variability
has increased unemployment and reduced employment, a finding that had an
important bearing on the evaluation of costs and benefits of EMU (see, e.g.,
Belke and Gros, 2001). More recently, Belke and Gros (2002a) have shown in
the context of a project for the European Commission that exchange rate
variability might also have significant negative effects on labour markets at
the global level. Their results indicate that transatlantic exchange rate
variability does have a significant negative impact on labour markets in the
EU, and possibly also in the US. The authors argue that volatility matters
because employment and investment decisions are characterised by some
degree of irreversibility in the presence of structural rigidities. Such decisions
tend to be discouraged by exchange rate variability, as can be shown in a
variety of economic models. A third category of studies is related to the
emerging markets. Here, Belke and Gros (2002) have investigated the
Mercosur area. 
If similar results can be found for the currencies of the Central and
Eastern European EU applicant countries, they would warrant a new look at
the costs and benefits of joining EMU or of using early euroisation1 as a
strategy to fulfil the Maastricht criterion of exchange rate stability. The main
purpose of this paper is thus to provide a sound basis for an (indirect)
evaluation of the costs of the present exchange rate relations of CEEC
currencies vis-à-vis the euro and of the benefits of individual time-paths of
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1 Euroisation is defined as the wholesale unilateral adoption of the euro (Nuti 2002, p. 434). For
surveys on the costs and benefits of euroisation see Alesina and Barro (2001, pp. 381 ff.) and Nuti
(2002).exchange rate policies for selected CEECs on their way towards full
membership in EMU. It is argued that early entry strategies might be
motivated with an eye to the benefits resulting from suppressed exchange rate
volatility. 
The conventional view of EMU enlargement is to converge first, and
durably, and then join. For the eight CEE Countries scheduled to join the EU
in May 2004 the time frame for EMU enlargement is, thus, quite clear: EU
admission also formally implies membership in EMU. Initially, however, the
new EU members will have a right of derogation concerning the introduction
of the euro. When can and should derogation be lifted, i.e. when should the
euro be introduced in these countries? And how can it be ensured that the
transition to the euro is smooth? The earliest possible date of entry into the
euro zone is 2006, if the EU’s new member states spend the prescribed two
years in the ERM2 system immediately after EU accession.2 A number of the
acceding countries (e.g. the Baltic States and Slovenia) have indeed expressed
a willingness to proceed to the euro zone as quickly as possible. Other
countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are more sceptical
concerning a rapid adoption of the euro.
Let us now provide a picture of the development of CEEC trade
integration. In general, the CEECs are small, open economies. In most
CEECs, external trade (imports and exports) accounts for above one-third of
GDP, in countries such as Slovenia (67 per cent) or Estonia (58 per cent) the
degree of openness even exceeds 50 per cent of GDP. Only Bulgaria (23 per
cent), Romania (15 per cent) and, due to its larger size, Poland (26 per cent)
have a somewhat smaller openness index (Buiter and Grafe, 2002). Boreiko
(2002) demonstrates the importance of trade with EMU countries for the
CEECs, relating imports and exports to the euro zone to total imports and
exports in 1993-2000. His tables show clearly that most of the CEECs have
already reached a high share of trade with the euro zone. In some cases – such
as Hungary (0.70), Poland (0.67), Slovenia (0.67), Czech Republic (0.66) – the
shares are close to the average of EMU intra-trade (around 0.67 in 1999-2000).
The realisations for the other candidate countries are lower (Romania: 0.63,
Estonia: 0.59, Slovak Republic: 0.54, Latvia: 0.52, Bulgaria: 0.50, Lithuania:
0.46). These differences in openness should be kept in mind for the empirical
analysis, since they should, of course, influence the impact of euro exchange
rate variability on the labour markets in the respective candidate country. The
same is valid for the average degree of openness of the CEECs and the results
expected from a pooled regression analysis.
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2 However, due to technical and logistic reasons, it can realistically be expected that the candidate
countries will join the euro zone at the earliest in 2007 (see, e.g., Lavrac, 2003, p. 8ff.).The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section II we discuss a
theoretical model to illustrate the negative relationship between exchange
rate volatility and labour market performance. Section III defines our
measure of exchange rate variability. Section IV presents and comments on
the regression results. Section V concludes with a discussion of the
implications of our results for the design of future CEEC monetary relations
with the euro zone.
II MODELLING THE IMPACT OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 
ON LABOUR MARKETS
Most economists would probably assume that exchange rate variability
cannot have a significant impact on labour markets, given that the link
between exchange rate variability and the volume of trade is known to be
weak. However, we would argue that there are some qualifications to such a
conclusion: in developing countries the level and variability of the exchange
rate may be more important than in developed countries. There are several
reasons why exchange rate volatility should have a strong negative impact on
emerging economies and, hence, may constitute the basis for the fear of large
exchange rate swings (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). 
First, the pattern of trade invoicing is different in emerging markets as
compared to that in industrial countries. Following McKinnon (1999), primary
commodities are primarily dollar invoiced. Since the emerging market
economies exports generally have a high primary commodity content,
exchange rate volatility should have a significant impact on the foreign trade
of these countries. Additionally, capital markets in emerging markets are of an
incomplete nature.3 If futures markets are either illiquid or even non-existent,
tools for hedging the exchange rate risk are simply not available in these
countries. Another feature why emerging markets are on average more
intolerant to large exchange rate fluctuations is due to the higher openness of
these countries. When imports make up a large share of the domestic
consumption basket, the pass-through from exchange rate swings to inflation
is much higher (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, pp. 18 ff.).
How can one illustrate the transmission channel that could account for a
negative relationship between exchange rate variability and labour market
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3 This argument is less important for countries with more efficient financial markets like The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. However, problems that erupted in the Czech and
Hungarian banking sector over the last years indicate that these countries are still vulnerable to
speculative attacks – especially in the context of an elimination of all capital controls as is
required by the acquis communautaire (Begg et al., 2001; National Bank of Hungary, 2002).performance? The theoretical models that are used to describe this
relationship typically start from the idea that, in order to export, one needs to
sustain a sunk cost, due to irreversible investments in the underlying
production process, set-up costs of distribution in the export markets, etc. A
fully-fledged model is developed by Belke and Gros (2002a) to illustrate a
mechanism that explains a negative relationship between exchange rate
uncertainty and job creation. This model was originally based on the idea that
uncertainty of future earnings raises the ‘option value of waiting’ on decisions,
which concern investment projects in general (Dixit, 1989; Belke and Gros,
2001). In this framework, Belke and Gros (2002a) model the labour market
more explicitly. When firms open a job, they have to incur sunk costs, which
reflect the cost of hiring, training and the provision of job-specific capital.
Moreover, wage payments are typically also sunk costs since firing restrictions
and employment contracts prevent the firms from firing the workers too
rapidly. If the exchange rate is uncertain, firms fear an unfavourable
appreciation of the (domestic) currency in which case they incur heavy losses.
With high uncertainty, firms may prefer to delay job creation, and this is even
so if they are risk-neutral. The relationship between exchange rate
uncertainty and (un-)employment should be particularly strong if the labour
market is characterised by generous unemployment benefit systems, powerful
trade unions, minimum wage restrictions or large hiring costs. 
Implicit in these kinds of models is the assumption that the firm and the
worker sign a binding employment contract for two periods (zero and one).
Hence they cannot sign a contract that allows for the possibility of job
termination in the first period whenever the exchange rate turns out to be
unfavourable. In order to investigate whether uncertainty also leads to delays
in the decision to fire, one should consider the scenario of a labour market in
which the firm and the worker can sign a contract only for one period (and,
hence, firing becomes relevant) and keep the option to terminate the work
relationship whenever it becomes unprofitable. Hence, this alternative set-up
allows for the possibility of job destruction. Based on this kind of set-up, it can
be shown that there is also a negative impact of exchange rate uncertainty on
employment in this case. The probability of job destruction is increasing in
uncertainty. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced if the worker’s fallback
wage is higher. The overall adverse employment effects of these features have
been confirmed empirically in various studies, and there are many other
theoretical mechanisms to explain them (see, e.g., Nickell, 1997). Thus, we
would expect that uncertainty has a negative effect on new hiring and a
positive one on the amount of job firing.
These theoretical considerations show that it is difficult to maintain the
hypothesis that exchange rate variability does not have a significant impact
COSTS OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY FOR LABOUR MARKETS 271on unemployment. Are we justified then to argue that this transmission
channel is applicable to the CEECs? Obviously, the temptation to postpone job
creation should be especially strong if a country is characterised by extensive
labour market rigidities (and therefore higher sunk costs in the job creation
process). Where do the CEECs stand in this respect? Labour markets of most
of the current EU members are widely considered to be rigid enough to give
leeway to the functioning of the mechanism explained in the model by Belke
and Gros (2002a). A study launched by the World Bank (and summarised in
Table 1) has assessed the flexibility of labour market institutions in six CEE
Countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia. According to their findings, based on a large scale of indicators for
regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals, the CEE
Countries generally opted for labour market institutions similar to those in
Western Europe (Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo, Silva-Jáuregui, 2002). As in
continental Europe, labour market rigidities include the exceedingly
restrictive regulations on hiring and firing practices, as well as burdensome
social insurance schemes. Employment stability protection like mandated
severance payments and other regulations penalising employment
termination in the CEECs is even stricter than in some EU Countries. Riboud
et al. (2002) conclude that the CEECs range somewhere in the middle of the
labour market flexibility scale compared to the EU Economies. 
These results are consistent with findings by Belke and Hebler (2002) and
Cazes (2002) who state that Central European Countries have adopted labour
market institutions, institutional arrangements and legal frameworks that
share many common features with present EU Member Countries. This trend
clearly increases job creation costs. It is further supported by the fact that the
CEECs are required, prior to their entry into the EU, to align their legislation
with the acquis communautaire, which includes a number of provisions
regarding labour market regulations. This kind of legislation has favoured
employment protection while taxing employers heavily. Hence, the
transmission channel from exchange rate variability to labour market
performance that we have described seems to be relevant in the case of the
CEECs also.
The next step is to address whether different measures of exchange rate
volatility – both nominal and real effective volatility vis-à-vis the 31 most
important trade partners and the bilateral volatility of the nominal and real
euro exchange rate – have any ability to explain the residuals of
unemployment regressions for CEE Economies. Up to now, the literature
examining the link between exchange rate variability and labour market
performance in emerging markets is rather thin. Hence, we begin by
presenting and commenting on some initial results. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to test empirically for the conjectured impact of exchange rate
variability on labour-market performance, we employ a panel of ten Central
and Eastern European Countries, namely Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ),
Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL),
Romania (RO), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SL). We do not leave the two
EU latecomers Bulgaria and Romania aside, because Bulgaria, at least, is
often said to be a clear case for euroisation.
The nominal variability of the currency of each of the ten CEE Countries
is measured by taking for each year the standard deviation of the 12 month-
to-month changes in the logarithm of its nominal exchange rate against the
currencies of their main trade partner countries. The construction of the real
variability variable follows an analogous scheme. The nominal exchange rates
are deflated with the CPI. The standard deviations based on bilateral rates are
then aggregated in one composite measure of exchange rate variability
(denoted by “VOL” below) using the weights that approximate the importance
of these currencies in trade with the 31 most important trade partners for the
period 1991-2002. The average trade weight of CEEC X with country Y (Y =
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Croatia, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland, US, Turkey) is calculated as
100 times the exports to country Y plus imports from country Y divided by
total exports to the “world” plus total imports from the “world”). In our
definition, the aggregate “world” corresponds to the sum of countries Y.4 We
did not use the annually changing trade weights since our volatility measure
would then change to the same degree as the change in trade pattern varies.
Based on the monthly CPI series for the 30 most important trade partners,
the nominal bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar of these 31
countries and the respective trade weights, we calculated the following
volatilities of the exchange rate: 
• 10 times 30 volatilities of the nominal bilateral exchange rate,
• 10 times 30 volatilities of the real bilateral exchange rate,
• 10 effective volatilities of the nominal exchange rate (weighted bilateral
volatilities), and
• 10 effective volatilities of the real exchange rate (weighted bilateral
volatilities).
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4 It should be noted that trade data for Euroland substitute the data for the single euro zone
member countries from 1999 on.It should be emphasised that the first two series refer to the exchange rate
volatility “vis-à-vis the euro”. This is calculated as the volatility vis-à-vis the
DM from 1990:01 until 1998:12, and vis-à-vis the euro from 1999:01. We prefer
to aggregate the individual standard deviations instead of using a standard
deviation of an average or effective exchange rate because there is extensive
evidence that CEEC exporters have priced to market. With an average
exchange rate the zloty, for example, could remain constant because the
depreciation against the euro would compensate the appreciation against the
Bulgarian lewa. Polish firms would not necessarily be indifferent between a
situation in which the average exchange rate is constant because the
zloty/euro and the zloty/lewa are constant, and another in which the swings in
these two bilateral rates just happen to cancel each other out. 
We  use monthly exchange rates to calculate volatility instead of daily
volatility to ensure consistency throughout our entire sample period. Another
reason to prefer this measure to shorter-term alternatives (e.g., daily
variability) was that, while the latter might be important for financial actors,
they are less relevant for export or employment decisions. The drawback of
monthly exchange rates is that we had to use annual data to have a
meaningful measure of variability. We are left with only eleven observations
for each country.5
We  use actual as opposed to unanticipated rates, since in order to be
consistent with our model described in Section II, we assume that the
exchange rate follows a random walk. Thus, actual and unanticipated
exchange rate changes should be the same. We feel justified to make this
assumption since extensive research based on work by Meese and Rogoff
(1983) and Meese (1990) has shown that the random walk model outperforms
other standard exchange rate models in out-of-sample forecasting. This still
holds even when seemingly relevant economic variables are included. 
Our sample covers the period 1990 to 2001 in order to exploit all available
data information. However, in view of the financial turmoil in the first years
of transition, our estimations mostly exclude at least the year 1990. The
average exchange rate variability for each of the ten CEECs under
investigation is plotted in Figure 1 (per cent per month). Peaks occur usually
in the year 1998, with the two non-EU Acceding Countries Bulgaria and
Romania as clear outliers with high double-digit realisations. Low volatility
values typically appear at the end of the sample, especially in 2000 and 2001.
Effective real volatility has decreased for countries that used exchange rate
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5 In principle one might employ option prices to extract implicit forward looking volatilities, but
option prices are generally available only for the US dollar and sometimes against the DM, and
even then only for limited periods.arrangements close to fixed rates, but remained high for Poland and Romania
and was quite high for Latvia and Lithuania (for a similar observation see
Boreiko, 2002, pp. 14 ff.). In the case of the countries with macroeconomic
instability and high inflation, an inspection of our data reveals that the
variation in the bilateral real exchange rate is large and much higher than
nominal exchange rate variability. This is somewhat surprising given the fact
that PPP is usually closer to holding for countries with very high rates of
inflation, which would suggest that real exchange rate variability should be
smaller. However, it seems obvious that a high real exchange rate variability
signals weak macroeconomic management, rather than an adjustment need of
the real sector. 
We limit our empirical analysis to the impact of exchange rate variability
on the unemployment rate. This restriction is made for two reasons: First, if
labour force is constant, the coefficients on unemployment and the growth rate
in employment would be approximately equal in absolute value and of
opposite sign. Hence, if employment were affected simultaneously, or (more
likely) with some lag, this would be totally in line with our model. Second, we
think that from a political point of view the unemployment rate is a much
more interesting indicator since its rise and fall have a much higher
importance in the political debate than the corresponding course for the
employment rate. In addition, this variable is typically derived from reliable
surveys. In contrast, employment data are often official and biased data.
Hence, we focus solely on the unemployment rate as the statistically most
reliable and politically most relevant indicator of the labour market stance in
the CEECs. We use the unemployment rate in per cent at the end of the
period.
As a cyclical control variable in the unemployment equations we include
the real growth rate of the gross domestic product, in per cent. The
development of wage costs is approximated by the real growth rate of average
gross monthly wages in per cent. With the exception of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania where we used Eurostat and national sources, the data for
unemployment, GDP growth and wage costs are taken for the CEEC data set
compiled by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.
In order to convey a broad-brush view on the data set and some of the
possible correlations four scatter plots are presented in Figure 1. It shows
cross-plots of our measure for total economy unemployment against exchange
rate volatility. All variables are averaged over the period 1990 to 2001.
As expressed by the simple scatter plots relating the average
unemployment rate to the average volatility measure, the conjectured positive
relationship between exchange rate volatility and unemployment is not so
obvious in a cross-country perspective. What matters is that the overall
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Figure 1: Employment Performance and Exchange Rate Volatility













a) Effective nominal exchange rate volatility 













c) Nominal exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the Euro
d) Real exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the Eurorelationship in the figures is upward sloping (non-vertical and non-horizontal).
Hence, we fit a very preliminary bivariate regression of the average
unemployment rate on an average of four different measures of exchange rate
variability. In three of these four cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a
positive relationship according to the fitted regression lines. However, in order
to investigate the validity of our hypothesis more deeply, we will conduct fully
specified regressions in the following section. The example of Estonia shows
that the introduction of a currency board does not shelter an economy from the
negative impact of effective exchange rate variability. The same is valid with
respect to Latvia, with its exchange rate fixed to the SDRs.
Our formal empirical analysis is based on tests of the non-stationarity of
the levels and the first differences of the variables under consideration, i.e.,
the total economy unemployment rate, the different operationalisations of
exchange rate volatility, and the real growth rate of average gross monthly
wages.6 The test applied is the first widely used panel data unit root test by
Levin and Lin (1992).7 The results indicate that only the unemployment rate
has to be differenced once to become stationary. Our unit root tests reveal
evidence of a stationary behaviour of the levels of exchange rate volatility and
of real wage growth. Hence, we use the change in the unemployment rate, and
levels of exchange rate volatility in the following pooled estimations.
IV EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
Based on our theoretical arguments, we conjecture that, controlling for the
usual key variables on the labour market,8 we can show in a cross-country
panel analysis of Central and Eastern European countries that exchange rate
variability worsens labour-market performance. To test for a significant
negative relationship between exchange rate variability and labour-market
performance, we undertake a fixed effects estimation. By this, we account for
different intercepts and, hence, different natural rates of unemployment
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6 The results of unit root tests for the employment protection legislation index are available on
request. It should be kept in mind that the artificial and constructed character of these
institutional variables can create serious problems for their correct empirical treatment. Hence,
in cases of doubt about the order of integration we do not rely too much on the numerical results
but stick to economic intuition when specifying our regression equations.
7 This test represents a direct extension of the univariate ADF test setting to panel data. The
results by Levin and Lin indicate that panel data is particularly useful for distinguishing between
unit roots and highly persistent stationarity in macroeconomic data and that their unit root test
for panel data is appropriate in panels of moderate size (between 10 and 250 cross-sections) as
encountered in our study.
8 We do this by allowing for country-specific constants in the unemployment regressions or by
implementing real wage growth or a labour market protection legislation index.estimated for each CEEC.9 In the literature random effects models are
sometimes additionally implemented, mainly because fixed effects models and
country-dummies are costly in terms of lost degrees of freedom. We decided to
dispense with a random effects estimation because it would only be
appropriate, if we really believed that our sampled cross-sectional units were
drawn from a large common population as is not the case here. The key
distinction between fixed and random effects models is whether the individual
effects should be treated as correlated with the x’s or not. The former would
speak in favour of the estimation of a fixed effects model. The latter would
imply a random effects estimator. However, in our case there is practically
speaking little reason to treat the individual effects as uncorrelated with the
other regressors as assumed in the random effects model (Greene, 2003, pp.
293ff., and Hsiao, 2002, pp. 149ff.). In any case, we checked for possible
problems with the fixed effects estimation by testing explicitly for random
versus fixed effects by means of the Hausman specification test. The null
hypothesis that random effects is the better option (i.e., unbiased) was rejected
according to the chi-squared tables at the usual significance levels throughout
our specifications. Hence, we feel legitimised to strictly stick to a fixed effects
estimator.10
The empirical model we use can be described by the usual form:11
yit = αi + x'it βi + εit, (1)
with yit as the dependent (macroeconomic labour market) variable, xit and βi
as k-vectors of non-constant regressors (e.g., exchange rate variability) and
parameters for i = 1, 2, … ,N cross-sectional units and t = 1, 2, … ,T as the
periods for which each cross-section is observed. Imposing ai = aj = a, a pooled
analysis with common constants is nested in this specification.
In order to test for significance of the impact of exchange rate volatility on
labour-market performance in CEECs, we separate our analysis into three
logical steps. We note that basing the analysis on levels of the unemployment
rate as an endogenous lagged variable is problematic for, at least, two reasons.
First, unemployment and employment time series might be plagued by non-
stationarity problems (see Section III). This problem is less severe, though,
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9 Due to the limited availability of data for the CEECs with a maximum of 11 annual observations
country-specific regressions are not (yet) an option.
10 The results are not displayed here due to scarcity of place. However, they are available on
request from the authors.
11 Dummies for different exchange rate regimes are not included throughout the regressions since
the impact of different exchange rate regime on the labour market is exactly the focus of our study.since the unemployment rate is bounded by one from above and by zero from
below. Second, one has to take account of the well-known problem of
endogenous lagged variables in the context of panel analyses (group effects).
This is usually achieved by taking first differences, which is a further reason
why we conducted our analysis in these terms. Third, the theoretical interest
is in a link between the level of exchange rate volatility and the change in the
unemployment rate. According to this specification, a one-time shock in
exchange rate volatility results in a permanent increase in the unemployment
rate. This exactly mirrors the central persistence implication of the model
which postulates that even a short-term increase in exchange rate uncertainty
leads to less hiring and more firing. The dynamic implications of our
specification are thus acceptable for temporary shocks, i.e. spikes, in exchange
rate variability which were emphasised in our model.
In principle, our panel data set need not be applied to a static specification
(in the following tables this corresponds to the first column for each volatility
measure). Especially with respect to the well-known path-dependence of the
unemployment rate, it is advisable to test for dynamic effects also. In order to
capture the speed of adjustment of labour markets, we use the option to
include lagged unemployment variables in the set of regressors throughout
this paper. The corresponding setting with respect to a representative
regression equation for one cross-section out of the whole system (described by
the index i) can be described as follows:
yit = αi + x'it βi + δyi,t–1 εit (2)
However, for estimating our first-order model substantial complications have
to be taken into account, due to the heterogeneity of the cross-sections
analysed (Greene, 2000, pp. 582 ff.). The main problem to be treated here is
the correlation of the lagged dependent variable (unemployment rate or level
of employment) with the disturbance, even if the latter does not exhibit
autocorrelation itself. While taking first differences enables one to get rid of
heterogeneity, i.e., the group effects, the problem of the correlation between
the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance still remains. Moreover, a
moving-average error term now appears in the specification. However, the
treatment of the resulting model is a standard application of the instrumental
variables approach. The transformed model looks as follows:
yit – yi,t–1 = (xit – xi,t–1)' βi + δ(yi,t–1 – yi,t–2) + (εit – εi,t–1) (3)
Arellano (1989) and Greene (2003) for instance recommend using the
differences (yi,t–2 – yi,t–3) or the lagged levels yi,t–2 and yi,t–3 as instrumental
COSTS OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY FOR LABOUR MARKETS 281variables for (yi,t–1 – yi,t–2) in order to derive a simple instrumental variable
estimator. The remaining variables can be taken as their own instruments.
Arellano (1989) gives some theoretical and empirical support in favour of
preferring levels to differences as instruments. As our second step of analysis,
we therefore implement this procedure within a dynamic framework (in the
following tables this corresponds to the second column for each volatility
measure). As a third step, we conduct robustness tests by also including
variables representing labour-market rigidities. Throughout our regressions,
we take the change in the unemployment rate as the regressand.
Throughout the paper we rely on Feasible Generalised Least Squares
(FGLS) estimates of a model assuming the presence of cross-sectional
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation but without correction for con-
temporaneous correlation.12 One might argue that uncorrelatedness across
our cross-sectional units (countries) is too strong an assumption because our
model assigns the same parameter vector to all units in the common
coefficients case, in which SUR estimates of a model with heteroscedasticity
and cross-sectional correlation would be suitable. However, in view of the fact
that correlations across countries might become relevant mainly in the case of
symmetric shocks to the labour markets and that the probability of the latter
might be small in our large sample (see, e.g., Babetski, Boone, Maurel, 2002),
it is legitimate to apply an FGLS specification that assumes solely the
presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity (Table 2). In order to be consistent
in the sense of accounting for the possibility of symmetric shocks (i.e.,
contemporaneous correlation), we nevertheless refrain from considering this
case and apply also the seemingly unrelated regression technique (SUR) in our
regression analysis (Tables 3 and 4).
The structure for presenting the estimation results is the same for tables
2 to 4 with the exact specifications of the pooled estimation equations being
described in the tables themselves. Half of the specifications include a lagged
endogenous labour-market variable. All specifications contain
contemporaneous real GDP growth with or without its lagged value as cyclical
control, different measures of exchange rate variability and the estimates of
the country-specific constants.13 The number of lags of the relevant variables
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12 See Greene (2000, p. 592). Motivated by inspections of the country-specific residuals we include
an AR error term in some of our specifications which enables us to get rid of autocorrelation
problems in the time dimension. Following Greene (2000, p. 605), we prefer to impose the
restriction of a common autocorrelation coefficient across countries in these cases.
13 The inclusion of a cyclical control variable can itself be interpreted as a first robustness test.
Due to lack of space, the country-specific constants, while interesting on their own, are not
displayed in the tables.were determined by the estimation itself. As in our previous studies, we
limited possible lags to a number from 0 to 2 (annual data) and then tested
down. Note that the number of observations in each case depends on the
variables included and on their lags. The fit of each equation is checked by
referring to the R-squared, the F-statistics and the Durbin-Watson time series
test for autocorrelation of residuals.14 Since the marginal significance level of
the F-test of joint significance of all of the slope coefficients is in all cases
clearly below 1 per cent, the p-value is not explicitly tabulated. However, the
degrees of freedom can be easily read off the tables.15
Let us first turn to our basic regressions in Table 2 (based on the FGLS
procedure) and Table 3 (based on SUR estimation) for a sample consisting of
all the ten EU candidate countries. 
It is remarkable that the estimated coefficients measuring the impact of
exchange rate volatility on the unemployment rate are mostly significant and
always display the expected sign. As studies for other regions suggest, the
economic impact of exchange rate volatility seems to be small but non-
negligible. The results are generally weaker for euro exchange rate volatility
than for effective volatility. The euro volatility is only significant in the static
specifications. However, there is no significant difference between the
coefficients for nominal and real volatility. This is not surprising in view of the
well-known fact that in the very short run changes in nominal and real
exchange rates are highly correlated. The estimated fixed effects exactly
mirror the differences in the natural rate of unemployment, as plotted in
Figure 1, with Poland and the Slovak Republic clearly displaying the highest
rigidities. A commonly accepted prior, the significance of contemporaneous
GDP growth in determining the unemployment rate, is corroborated by all
specifications. The available test statistics point towards correct
specifications. Both features are also valid for the following tables. All in all,
it seems that the ten CEECs are a group too heterogeneous to be characterised
by a similarly strong impact of euro exchange rate volatility.
Hence, we generalised the specifications chosen above by estimating a
separate coefficient of exchange rate volatility for each of the ten CEEC
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14 However, some caveats apply with respect to the application of the DW-statistics. The use of the
DW is critical not only in cases of endogenous lagged variables, but its application in panels is
generally problematic. Our estimations show that the DW changes its empirical realisation
depending on the ordering of the cross-section identifiers. However, we are unaware of other easily
available tests for panels, and the DW indicates for our panel that, in nearly all cases, we would
not be able to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
15 The numerator degrees of freedom can be calculated as the number of explaining variables less
one and the denominator degrees of freedom corresponds to the numbers of observations minus



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.candidates in order to allow for heterogeneity with respect to the impact of
volatility. According to our model, this heterogeneity might stem from different
degrees of labour market rigidities and/or from different levels of volatility
experienced in the past. Allowing for different volatility coefficients for each
CEEC, we might be able to identify those countries which drive our results.
The results from the SUR procedure are reported in Table 4.16
For effective volatilities and based on the SUR estimates, it turns out that
unemployment rates in the Czech Republic, Latvia and the Slovak Republic,
and in the case of the static specification also in Bulgaria, are significantly
influenced by effective real exchange rate variability. If one turns to effective
nominal exchange rate volatility, the pattern changes insofar as now the
coefficient of volatility is additionally significant for Hungary and Romania in
both the static and the dynamic specification. Estonia, Poland and Slovenia
are identified as those CEECs that are also affected by effective nominal
exchange rate variability, according to one specification. However, the results
do not seem to be driven by the degree of exchange rate volatility experienced
by a single CEEC, since the countries that display persistently higher effective
volatility (such as Poland, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania) do not display a
bulk of significant coefficients of volatility, with the exception of Latvia. Hence,
the often stressed heterogeneity among the candidate countries becomes
obvious too with respect to the impact of exchange rate volatility.
However, the pattern becomes more significant and consistent when the
bilateral euro volatilities of the CEEC currencies are included. If one
correlates these results with our considerations with regard to openness vis-à-
vis the euro zone, it becomes obvious that the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, as the economies which are most open to trade with the euro zone, are
among those countries for which the results are most in line with our main
hypothesis. These countries are joined by Romania and the Slovak Republic
with four entries as well. Bulgaria as the outlier in terms of volatility and,
hence, a candidate for euroisation, and Latvia have two entries each.
Lithuania, Slovenia and, somewhat surprisingly, Estonia display one
significant coefficient of exchange rate volatility. With the exception of
Slovenia, these results closely correspond to our expectations based on the
country-specific degrees of openness described in Section I. However,
according to Figure 1, Slovenia reveals one of the lowest degrees of exchange
rate volatility. This is a plausible reason why Slovenia’s high degrees of
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16 Those based on FGLS lead to strikingly similar conclusions and are available on request.openness towards the euro zone and of labour market rigidities do not lead to
more significant entries in Table 4.17
VS UMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The results of this paper suggest that the high degree of exchange rate
variability observed from time to time in the CEECs has tangible economic
costs. Our earlier studies on intra-EMS, transatlantic and Mercosur exchange
rate variability have already indicated that reductions in exchange rate
variability could yield substantial benefits for small open economies. It is fully
possible that the same applies for most of the CEECs. It was argued that this
result is due to the fact that all employment decisions have some degree of
irreversibility. We investigated both effective and bilateral euro exchange rate
variability since we were interested in the costs of exchange rate variability in
general (effective volatilities) and in evaluating one partial benefit of
euroisation – the elimination of the exchange rate risk – in particular
(bilateral volatilities vis-à-vis the euro). In general, our results are rather
strong in that we find that exchange rate variability in many cases has a
significant impact on the unemployment rate. Moreover, the data confirm the
expectation that economies with relatively closer ties with the euro zone, such
as the Czech Republic, would show a stronger impact of euro exchange rate
variability. The estimated impact coefficients were in most of the cases smaller
if we pooled all of the ten CEECs. This systematic correlation between
openness and the strength of the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade
corresponds to the general finding of the literature, which is that for emerging
markets this channel is much more important.
What are the implications of the results concerning the labour market
impact of euro volatility for the debate on exchange rate policy in the CEECs?
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17 As a final step, we corroborated our analysis by extensive robustness checks. In the first step,
we limit the sample to a group of rather homogenous countries with respect to labour market
regulation, namely the Visegrád Economies: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak
Republic. The magnitude of the estimated volatility coefficients and their significance levels
increase dramatically. A second robustness check which includes indicators of strictness of
employment protection legislation as interaction variables in the regressions also performs quite
well. All coefficients of the interaction variables are significant, the majority even at the 1 per cent
significance level. As a third and final robustness check we implement a measure for real wage
growth in order to check whether the result of a significant relationship between exchange rate
volatility and the unemployment rate found in this paper is driven by a missing third variable
related to labour costs. Compared with the baseline estimation, the pattern of results did not
change a great deal. We also check for the exogeneity of the volatility and robustness variables
with respect to the change of the unemployment rate by extensive Granger causality tests. Due to
lack of space, the results are not presented here, but are available upon request.Given the preliminary character of our analysis, one certainly has to be
cautious in terms of policy conclusions. However, our main result could be read
as support for the policy conclusion that fixing exchange rates against the euro
should bring significant benefits. A common argument against reducing
exchange rate variability is the position that economies need some safety valve
somewhere. In other words, would the suggested gains from suppressing
exchange rate variability be lost, if the volatility reappeared elsewhere, for
example in higher interest rate variability? We would argue that it is not
possible at present to say whether the volatilities of other variables will go up
or down with efforts to limit CEEC exchange rate fluctuations. But research
by Rose (1999) and others indicates, for example, that official action can
reduce exchange rate variability simply by holding the variability of
fundamentals such as interest rates and money constant. Policy co-ordination
between the central banks could thus keep the volatility of a CEEC currency
vis-à-vis the Euro under control. The same is, of course, valid with respect to
entering EMU.
Furthermore, it is now widely considered a stylised fact that exchange
rates are disconnected from fundamentals (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000 and
the July 2002 issue of the Journal of Monetary Economics). The constant
threat of speculative attacks on emerging market currencies can actually
cause a co-movement of variables that does not exist for developed economies.
Referring to the CEE Countries, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility
that variability in the exchange rate in the 1990s has been caused by
variability in monetary policy. If this were the case, the cost of exchange rate
volatility reported here should be considered the cost of erratic monetary
policy. We are nevertheless confident that for the Central and Eastern
European EU candidate countries the general ‘disconnect’ between exchange
rates and fundamentals also holds in the short run and is even extended to
(domestic) interest rates, which for emerging markets are determined by
shocks coming from international financial markets. Even if the ‘disconnect’
did not hold, the results gained in this paper would be of interest, since they
then should fuel the debate on the relation between monetary policy rules and
exchange rate variability. In this event one might come to the conclusion that,
for some of the CEECs and other countries in similar situations, that
monetary integration with the euro area would be the optimal monetary policy
strategy.
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Data Sources: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (2002), Oesterreichische
Nationalbank (2002a), Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(2002), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania: Eurostat and national sources.
CPI:  Index of consumer prices.
GDP:  Gross domestic product, real growth rate,  per cent.
UNEMP:  Unemployment rate in per cent, end of period.
WAGE:  Average gross monthly wages, real growth rate,  per cent.
XR:  specified national currency [n.c.] units) per US dollar, monthly
average, nominal, bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis  other
countries than the US calculated via cross rates.
XRR:  specified national currency [n.c.] units) per US dollar, monthly
average, real (deflated with CPI), bilateral exchange rates vis-
à-vis other countries than the US calculated via cross rates.
VOLXREFF:  effective volatility of nominal exchange rates (3 bilateral
volatilities calculated for each CEEC, effective volatilities
were generated by multiplying each of the 3 bilateral
volatilities with the respective trade weight).
VOLXRREFF: effective volatility of real exchange rates (30 bilateral
volatilities calculated for each CEEC, effective volatilities
were generated by multiplying each of the 30 bilateral
volatilities with the respective trade weight).
The following country codes apply throughout the study: BG (Bulgaria), CZ
(Czech Republic), EE (Estonia), HU (Hungary), LV (Latvia), LT (Lithuania),
PL (Poland), RO (Romania), SK (Slovakia), SL (Slovenia).
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